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Article 
The Remains of the Citadel (Economic 
Loss Rule in Products Cases) 
Catherine M. Sharkey† 
  INTRODUCTION   
“[P]roducts liability law lies at the boundary between tort 
and contract.”1 At the outset of the twentieth century, product 
defect claims were squarely within the province of contract 
law—one could only recover if in privity of contract with the 
product seller, and only in accordance with the specific provi-
sions and limitations of contract.2 By the end of the century, 
products liability had emerged as a vibrant branch of tort law 
because of several dramatic changes in the law. Chief among 
these was the fall of the “citadel” of privity—“the cluster of 
rules precluding liability for certain kinds of wrongs unless the 
victim and injurer were in privity of contract.”3 Another related 
 
†  Crystal Eastman Professor of Law, New York University School of 
Law. Jack Millman (NYU 2016) and Caleb Seeley (NYU 2017) provided excel-
lent research assistance. I am grateful to my fellow symposium panelist, Ken 
Abraham, for lively engagement and suggestions and to my colleague, Mark 
Geistfeld, for comments. Copyright © 2016 by Catherine M. Sharkey.  
 1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. a (AM. LAW 
INST. 1998). 
 2. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A 
Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 461, 461 (1985) (“In the 1920s, recovery for injuries resulting from 
product use was chiefly determined by contract law . . . .”). One could recover if 
the seller had violated an express warranty, or an implied warranty required 
by law, such as a default warranty that a good was merchantable. Id. But see 
MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 10–19 (2d ed. 2011) 
(tracing the evolution of strict products liability from implied warranty, which 
had its origins in tort principles dating to the 18th century). 
 3. Kenneth S. Abraham, Prosser’s The Fall of the Citadel, 100 MINN. L. 
REV. 1823, 1823 (2016). The key case was MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 
N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (holding that a consumer could sue a manufacturer in 
tort for negligence). Before this, a consumer injured by a shoddily manufac-
tured car would have had to sue the seller for breach of contract based on a 
breach of an express or implied warranty, and then perhaps the seller would 
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trend was the expansion of the theory of implied warranty of 
merchantability beyond retailers and buyers.4 Additionally, 
traditional contract restrictions controlling warranties, such as 
the ability for parties to limit or disclaim liability, or notice re-
quirements, were dropped; this turned the implied warranty 
remedy into a de facto strict liability tort.5 Finally, the rise of 
the theory of strict products liability fueled this transformation 
of product defect claims from contract into tort.6 By the 1960s, 
an injured consumer not in privity with the manufacturer could 
often successfully sue using both a breach of contract (implied 
warranty) theory and a tort theory (either negligence or strict 
liability).7 
The privity requirement was a device for preventing “con-
current remedies” in contract and tort;8 with the fall of the priv-
 
sue the manufacturer for breaching the contract between them. Now, the con-
sumer had a direct remedy in tort against the manufacturer in addition to his 
or her contractual remedies. 
 4. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 82–84 (N.J. 
1960) (holding that an implied warranty of merchantability exists between a 
third-party manufacturer and the ultimate purchaser, and that “[a]bsence of 
agency between the manufacturer and the dealer who makes the ultimate sale 
is immaterial”). This allowed a consumer to sue directly a manufacturer for 
breach of contract under a theory of a breach of an implied warranty.  
 5. A general distinction between tort and contract is that contract impos-
es various restrictions on suing under warranty—such as notice requirements, 
limitations on recovery and on the statute of limitations, and a seller’s ability 
to disclaim liability; as courts began loosening those restrictions, the differ-
ence between suing in contract and tort narrowed. See, e.g., La Hue v. Coca-
Cola Bottling, Inc., 314 P.2d 421 (Wash. 1957) (holding that the notice re-
quirement for warranties does not apply when a consumer is suing a manufac-
turer not in privity); see also Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 
(N.D. Ind. 1965) (describing strict products liability as “hardly more than what 
exists under implied warranty when stripped of the contract doctrines of privi-
ty, disclaimer, requirements of notice of defect, and limitation through incon-
sistencies with express warranties”). To put it another way: “Henningsen effec-
tively imposed strict liability in tort, although the court did not describe it that 
way.” Abraham, supra note 3, at 1833. 
 6. This changed the standard from negligence to strict liability for con-
sumers suing manufacturers in tort. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 
Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (adopting strict products liability for manu-
facturing defect that caused physical injury); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. 
of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 461–68 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (arguing 
that strict liability should govern product defect claims for various policy rea-
sons). 
 7. See Curtis R. Reitz & Michael L. Seabolt, Warranties and Product Li-
ability: Who Can Sue and Where?, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 527, 527–31 (1973) (discuss-
ing purchasers’ dual lines of attack and how old restrictions on both began to 
lose force).  
 8. See Vernon Palmer, Why Privity Entered Tort: An Historical Reexami-
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ity limitation in products cases, there was a search for a new 
limiting principle for both the scope of liability and for concur-
rent theories of liability. The economic loss rule in products 
cases rears its head in the mid-1960s—not coincidentally, right 
at the triumphant moment for strict products liability and the 
widespread adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code’s set of 
warranties between retailers and buyers (i.e., parties in privity 
of contract)—to reassert the contract-tort border, circumscribe 
the strict liability rule, and defend privity’s last bastion. 
Judge Benjamin Cardozo coined a phrase in 1931 when he 
famously opined: “The assault upon the citadel of privity is pro-
ceeding in these days apace.”9 But it was William Prosser who 
assured its place in the legal firmament with a pair of path-
breaking articles, the first in 1960 proclaiming, The Assault 
upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),10 and the se-
cond six years later, announcing, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict 
Liability to the Consumer).11 
Prosser’s prophecy in The Assault upon the Citadel was 
prescient12 and his proclamation of The Fall of the Citadel and 
the triumph of strict liability theory in the area of defective 
products resolute. But his exuberance led him to overlook the 
last remaining bastion of privity: purely financial losses stem-
ming from product defects. 
 
nation of Winterbottom v. Wright, 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 85, 85 (1983) (argu-
ing that disfavor for concurrent remedies was a significant factor in explaining 
Winterbottom and other cases requiring privity to reduce the scope of negli-
gence liability). 
 9. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931) (emphasis 
added).  
 10. William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to 
the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, Assault]. G. 
Edward White has praised The Assault upon the Citadel as “a model of how 
legal scholarship can serve to further doctrinal change in a common law sub-
ject.” G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
169 (exp. ed. 2003). 
 11. William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1965) [hereinafter Prosser, Fall].  
 12. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 2, at 506 (“The timing of [the] publication 
[of The Assault upon the Citadel] must have created a sensation. Prosser’s ar-
ticle describing the trend toward the abolition of privity and the invalidation 
of disclaimers appeared one month . . . after [Henningsen] abolish[ed] privity 
and invalidat[ed] disclaimers. . . . This simultaneity of prediction and confir-
mation is extraordinary and is unknown even in scientific work.”); see also 
Abraham, supra note 3, at 1832 (“Prosser was both a prophet and more. As he 
had been in the past in predicting other changes in tort law, Prosser was ex-
tremely adept at prophesying legal change, even if he was apt to exaggerate 
the support he had for his predictions.”). 
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By and large, “through the late 1950s and early 1960s de-
fective product cases were controlled by contract law with its 
privity requirement and, to a substantially lesser extent, by 
negligence law.”13 Moreover, as Prosser explained in The Bor-
derland of Tort and Contract, concurrent remedies in implied 
warranty and negligence were commonly available; implied 
warranty was itself the “borderland” between tort and con-
tract.14 Thus, when Prosser wrote The Assault upon the Citadel 
in 1960—and decried, “the dam has busted, and . . . those in the 
path of the avalanche would do well to make for the hills”—he 
paid scant attention to the “refusal on the part of a few courts 
to allow recovery for pecuniary loss to the consumer caused by 
defects in the products itself, such as the cost of repairing it 
when it breaks down.”15 He thus overlooked the significance of a 
handful of notable stalwarts, holding fast to privity in the 
realm of negligently-inflicted purely economic losses.  
Chief among these was Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Curtiss-Wright Corp., in which the New York Supreme Court of 
New York County, in 1955, rebuffed a negligence claim seeking 
the replacement cost of allegedly defective airplane engines 
with the admonition: “If the ultimate user were allowed to sue 
the manufacturer in negligence merely because an article with 
latent defects turned out to be bad . . . there would be nothing 
left of the citadel of privity . . . .”16 Trans World Airlines (TWA) 
was a harbinger of the modern economic loss rule, a judicially 
created doctrine protecting the “remains of the citadel,” and one 
that would face increasing pressure to withstand the onslaught 
of claims following the rise of strict liability in products. 
Part I traces the fall of “the shackles of privity,”17 the rise 
of strict products liability, and the emergence of the economic 
 
 13. Priest, supra note 2, at 462. 
 14. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SE-
LECTED TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 422–29 (1954); see also William L. 
Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117 
(1943) (reviewing the common law underpinnings of the implied warranty of 
merchantability in the Uniform Sales Act). 
 15. Prosser, Assault, supra note 10, at 1103 n.27 (citing Wyatt v. Cadillac 
Motor Car Div., 302 P.2d 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956); Lucette Originals, Inc. v. 
Gen. Cotton Converters, Inc., 185 N.Y.S.2d 854 (App. Div. 1959); Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. 1955); A. J. 
P. Contracting Corp. v. Brooklyn Builders Supply Co., 11 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sup. 
Ct. 1939), aff’d mem., 15 N.Y.S.2d 424 (App. Div. 1939), aff’d per curiam, 28 
N.E.2d 412 (N.Y. 1940)). 
 16. 148 N.Y.S.2d at 289–90 (emphasis added). 
 17. Prosser, Fall, supra note 11, at 799. 
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loss rule. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. ushered in the revolu-
tion in 1916 by announcing the fall of privity.18 The TWA case 
was more than an outlier of its time; it was the harbinger of the 
economic loss rule in products cases, which gathered momen-
tum in the face of the rise of strict products liability. Once strict 
liability threatened to make manufacturers insurers for disap-
pointed economic expectations of remote consumers, courts 
drew a bright line and limited recovery to contracting parties, 
via express or implied warranty. Whereas the fall of privity and 
rise of strict products liability enabled product defect cases to 
move from contracts into torts, the economic loss rule forged a 
new dividing line, keeping purely financial loss cases within 
the domain of contract. From this vantage point, the economic 
loss rule emerged to protect the “remains” of the citadel of priv-
ity. 
Part II takes up the debate over the emergence of the eco-
nomic loss rule in products cases, as it was framed by the op-
posing positions taken by a pair of cases decided in 1965: the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian 
that opposed the rule19 and the California Supreme Court in 
Seely v. White Motor Co. that embraced it.20 Two decades later, 
in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 
the U.S. Supreme Court sided with Seely over Santor, ensuring 
the survival and spread of the economic loss rule to partition 
the “separate spheres” of products liability and contract law.21 
Part II further examines the competing rationales for rejecting 
the imposition of nondisclaimable tort duties independent of 
any contractual undertakings when product defects lead to fi-
nancial losses. The Conclusion then analyzes the normative 
significance of preserving the “remains of the citadel.”  
I.  THE “REMAINS OF THE CITADEL”   
In The Assault upon the Citadel, Prosser chronicles the 
transition of liability “where the seller of chattels defends 
against the ultimate consumer, with whom he stands in no 
 
 18. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916); see also, e.g., Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 
P. 633, 634 (Wash. 1913) (defining the privity bar as “a general rule that a 
manufacturer is not liable to any person other than his immediate vendee; 
that the action is necessarily one upon an implied or express warranty, and 
that without privity of contract no suit can be maintained; that each purchaser 
must resort to his immediate vendor”). 
 19. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965). 
 20. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965). 
 21. 476 U.S. 858, 870–71 (1986). 
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privity of contract,” from a regime governed by privity and war-
ranties to one ruled by negligence and strict liability.22 Prosser 
noted that while the requirement of privity had fallen in the 
face of claims of negligence in manufacturing, there was “still a 
refusal on the part of a few courts to allow recovery for pecuni-
ary loss to the consumer caused by the defects in the product 
itself, such as the cost of repairing it when it breaks down.”23 
Prosser nonetheless asserted: “Apart from these few cases, no 
one now seriously disputes the broad general rule that the sell-
er of a chattel is always liable for his negligence.”24 
Prosser, however, underestimated the force of the opposi-
tion. Far from being an outlier, TWA, one of the “few cases” 
mentioned by Prosser,25 presaged the emergence of the econom-
ic loss rule in the face of the rise of strict products liability. 
With Prosser’s attention fully captured by the dramatic siege 
on the citadel of privity, he overlooked the significance of the 
“remains of the citadel” pushing back by shutting out tort 
claims for purely financial losses.26 The citadel did fall when it 
came to claims of physical harm to persons or property, but the 
economic loss rule emerged to limit manufacturers’ and sellers’ 
liability for purely financial losses and thus defend this last 
bastion of privity. 
A. THE FALL OF PRIVITY AND LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC LOSSES  
IN TORT 
The early common law followed the Winterbottom v. Wright 
general rule of nonliability to persons not in privity of con-
tract.27 Specifically, absent privity of contract, a plaintiff could 
 
 22. Prosser, Assault, supra note 10, at 1099. 
 23. Id. at 1103. 
 24. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 1143 (discussing pure pecuniary 
loss cases in the same context as physical property damage cases). 
 25. Id. at 1103 & n.27. 
 26. In a similar vein, Baz Edmeades has argued that, for all of Prosser’s 
language about the end of a dramatic siege, the greater part of the citadel re-
mains unharmed: “[L]itigants alleging economic loss, instead of personal inju-
ry or property damage, are still without any remedy when they lack privity of 
contract with the defendant.” Baz Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recov-
ery of Economic Loss in American Products Liability, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
647, 648 (1977). 
 27. (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402; 10 M. & W. 109. Winterbottom is the 1842 
English case in which “the citadel of privity was erected, or at least first rec-
ognized.” Abraham, supra note 3, at 1826. For further discussion, see id. at 
1826–28 (detailing “the rise and fall of the citadel in negligence” from 
Winterbottom to MacPherson). But see GEISTFELD, supra note 2, at 10 (arguing 
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not recover in tort for harms caused by defective products. 
MacPherson v. Buick marked a shift in the early twentieth cen-
tury away from the privity requirement to impose a duty on a 
“remote” product manufacturer under negligence for dangerous 
products, regardless of contract or warranty.28 In hindsight, 
MacPherson was monumental in setting the stage for the dawn 
of strict products liability (to unfold over the subsequent four 
decades). Its actual holding was more modest, extending negli-
gence liability in tort to manufacturers of motor vehicles as 
“imminently dangerous” products—a category already recog-
nized as an exception to the privity bar.29 Nonetheless, 
“[w]hether, technically speaking, MacPherson overruled 
Winterbottom or only created a broader exception that eventu-
ally swallowed up the Winterbottom rule, within decades schol-
ars took the former view, and we certainly now understand 
MacPherson to have abolished the privity rule.”30 
What remained unclear was the scope of the manufactur-
er’s duty under negligence liability and, in particular, whether 
it extended to purely financial losses. At that time, in the early 
twentieth century, jurisdictions differed in how broadly they 
extended the scope of the manufacturer’s duty of care under 
negligence—specifically, whether it extended beyond physical 
injuries to persons and property to cover purely economic loss-
es.  
In 1913, in Mazetti v. Armour & Co.—described by Prosser 
as the “very first case which threw overboard the bar of privi-
ty”31—the Washington Supreme Court allowed a retailer of 
 
that the doctrine of implied warranty, based on tort principles, long predated 
Winterbottom, but conceding that “[w]hen Winterbottom was decided in the 
1840s, the implied warranty was firmly entrenched as a doctrine of contract 
law”). 
 28. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 29. In other words, in holding that a defective automobile was “a thing of 
danger,” the court expanded on a doctrine that had previously only been ap-
plied to products commonly regarded as inherently dangerous, such as poisons 
and explosives. See id. at 1053 (“We hold, then, that the principle of Thomas v. 
Winchester is not limited to poisons, explosives, and things of like nature, to 
things which in their normal operation are implements of destruction.” (citing 
Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852))); see also, e.g., Priest, supra note 2 
(suggesting that the change wrought by MacPherson was not so great, given 
that “it extended negligence liability only to manufacturers of products re-
garded as ‘imminently dangerous’ and only where it could be shown that the 
purchaser or an intermediate dealer would not inspect the product for de-
fects”). 
 30. Abraham, supra note 3, at 1827. 
 31. Prosser, Fall, supra note 11, at 821. 
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goods to sue the manufacturer in negligence, absent privity of 
contract, for purely financial losses, namely “injury to his busi-
ness and loss of reputation.”32 The Mazetti court staunchly re-
fused to draw the privity divide at physical injuries (or “health 
and comfort”33):  
It seems that the test should not rest in finding the plaintiff’s damage 
in health or business, but in answering the question whether there 
has been a damage which may be justly attributed to the negligence 
or a breach of duty on the part of the one who had power and whose 
duty it was to prevent the wrong.34 
The Washington Supreme Court thus applied the privity excep-
tion across the board, enabling claimants to bring negligence 
suits for breach of the duty of care, regardless of whether the 
ensuing damage impacted one’s “health” or one’s “business.”35 
In the first four decades following MacPherson, a few 
courts followed Mazetti’s lead—explicitly or implicitly—in not 
throwing down the gauntlet of privity to bar negligence claims 
against manufacturers for purely economic losses.36 But at the 
same time that these state supreme courts were dismantling 
the citadel of privity in product defect cases for all negligently 
inflicted losses—including purely financial losses—other courts 
were uniting in resistance. Significantly, in New York, “such an 
extension of the MacPherson rule [was] rejected.”37 New York 
and other “resisters” considered MacPherson the frontier and 
 
 32. 135 P. 633, 634 (Wash. 1913). Mazetti is a pre-MacPherson case that 
fashioned an additional exception to the privity bar that otherwise limited a 
manufacturer’s liability to any person other than his immediate buyer. Id. at 
636 (“To the old rule that a manufacturer is not liable to third persons who 
have no contractual relations with him for negligence in the manufacture of an 
article should be added another exception . . . arising . . . from changing condi-
tions of society.”). For discussion of Mazetti, see infra Part I.A.1. 
 33. Mazetti, 135 P. at 634. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. E.g., Sw. Ice & Dairy Prods. v. Faulkenberry, 220 P.2d 257, 258–60 
(Okla. 1950). 
 37. Karl’s Shoe Stores v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 145 F. Supp. 376, 377 
(D. Mass. 1956) (citing A. J. P. Contracting Corp. v. Brooklyn Builders Supply 
Co., 11 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff’d mem., 15 N.Y.S.2d 424 (App. Div. 
1939), aff’d per curiam, 28 N.E.2d 412 (N.Y. 1940)). In rejecting plaintiff’s 
claim for loss of revenue and good will based upon defective shoe cement that 
caused plaintiff’s shoes to be unfit for sale to the public, the court elaborated: 
“No case has been found in which a manufacturer has been held liable where 
no personal injury or physical injury to property was involved, and the plain-
tiff’s only complaint was of financial damage such as loss of business, revenue 
and good will.” Id. (citing A. J. P. Contracting, 11 N.Y.S.2d 662; Creedon v. 
Automatic Voting Mach. Corp., 276 N.Y.S. 609 (Sup. Ct. 1935)). 
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clung to privity in the realm of financial losses. These opposing 
camps are explored in turn below. 
1. Privity Barrier Falls: Recovery for Negligently-Inflicted  
Economic Losses 
The Washington Supreme Court, in Mazetti v. Armour & 
Co.,38 was the first to extend negligence-based liability against 
a product manufacturer to freestanding, purely financial losses. 
Mazetti involved a plaintiff restaurant that purchased from an 
intermediary grocery company a “carton of cooked tongue” 
manufactured by defendant Armour & Co. A patron of the res-
taurant was served a portion of the tongue—which was adul-
terated with “a foul, filthy, nauseating, and poisonous sub-
stance”—became violently ill, and “then and there in the 
presence of other persons publicly expose[d] and denounce[d] 
the service to him of such foul and poisonous food.”39 In such a 
case, it was fairly well established that the patron of the res-
taurant—who became violently ill from the adulterated food—
could sue the manufacturer in negligence, even absent privity 
of contract.40  
But it was a matter of first impression whether the restau-
rant could sue the manufacturer under negligence for its purely 
financial losses. The court recognized an exception to privity for 
food products that “rests on the principle that the original act of 
delivering the article is wrongful, and that everyone is respon-
sible for the natural consequences of his wrongful acts.”41 The 
court extended liability to the business losses caused by dam-
age to the reputation of the retailer, stating that when a manu-
facturer sells goods in a market: “[H]e, in effect, represents to 
each purchaser that the contents of the can are suited to the 
purpose for which it is sold, the same as if an express represen-
tation to that effect were imprinted upon a label.”42 Thus, “a 
manufacturer of food products under modern conditions im-
pliedly warrants his goods when dispensed in original packag-
es, and that such warranty is available to all who may be dam-
 
 38. 135 P. 633. 
 39. Id. at 633–34.  
 40. Id. at 634–35 (discussing various cases finding that the ultimate con-
sumer of prepared food may bring an action of negligence or breach of implied 
warranty directly against a manufacturer even if no privity exists between the 
two parties). 
 41. Id. at 635. 
 42. Id. at 636. 
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aged by reason of their use in the legitimate channels of 
trade.”43 
Subsequently, courts relied on Mazetti and allowed for the 
recovery, absent privity, of negligently-inflicted, pure economic 
losses. In 1950, the Oklahoma Supreme Court allowed a grocer 
to recover economic losses from a manufacturer for loss of busi-
ness under a theory of res ipsa loquitur, where a customer dis-
covered a dead mouse in a bottle of milk.44 In 1953, the Florida 
Supreme Court allowed a planter to recover for economic losses 
against a wholesaler who negligently mislabeled his seed, 
which grew into a different crop than the one anticipated by the 
planter.45 And, extending the rationale beyond food cases, in the 
1958 case Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, 
the Michigan Supreme Court held that privity was not a barri-
er to either negligence or implied warranty claims for financial 
losses, regardless of product type.46 Spence involved an implied 
warranty claim (which the court treated as a negligence claim) 
by a buyer against a manufacturer of defective cinder blocks 
used to construct a cottage. The defective cinder blocks were 
deteriorating and ugly but had not caused physical injury to 
persons or property.47 Allowing the case to proceed on a negli-
gence theory, the court reasoned:  
Either lack of privity should always be a defense in these cases, or it 
never should be. The basically contractual notion of privity in this 
context has largely to do with the right of a party to bring his action 
against the person he seeks to hold, regardless of injury suffered . . . . 
We . . . find no reason in logic or sound law why recovery in these sit-
 
 43. Id.  
 44. Sw. Ice & Dairy Prods. v. Faulkenberry, 220 P.2d 257, 258–60 (Okla. 
1950) (“A manufacturer or processor of food products under modern conditions 
impliedly warrants his goods when dispensed in original packages or bottles, 
and such warranty is available to all who may be damaged by their use in the 
legitimate channels of trade, including those who purchase them for resale.” 
(citing Mazetti, 135 P. 633)).  
 45. See Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla. 1953) (cit-
ing Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 19 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1944) (citing Mazetti, 
135 P. 633)). 
 46. 90 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Mich. 1958). In embracing the fall of privity, the 
court remarked that “the question presently before the Court is whether we 
are going to continue to be hobbled by such an obsolete rule and its swarming 
progeny of exceptions.” Id. at 877. 
 47. Aside from the issue of privity, the court held: “[I]n these circumstanc-
es and in this day and age appearance as well as structural safety and durabil-
ity is an important factor in determining the merchantable quality and fitness 
of these particular products as used in this case.” Id. at 876. 
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uations should be confined to injuries to persons and not to property, 
or allowed in food and related cases and denied in all others.48 
Spence thus set a precedent for negligence-based recovery 
for defective products causing financial losses.49 For many 
courts the only relevant question concerned whether or not 
privity applied, not what type of damages was at issue. In the 
words of a Michigan appellate court, “[C]ourts throughout the 
land have allowed recovery for economic loss, as did our Su-
preme Court in Spence.”50 
2. Privity Barrier Stands: Foreshadowing the Economic Loss  
Rule 
As noted above, Prosser paid only passing attention to a 
small group of cases that continued to require privity to recover 
for negligently inflicted economic losses by defective products. 
Warren Seavey, taking note of the same set of cases laying out 
a rule of no recovery, accorded them slightly more significance, 
suggesting that imposing liability for economic loss due to neg-
ligently manufactured products would “take a far greater step” 
than for physical damage.51 
But neither foresaw that this small cadre of resistance 
would become a bulwark against the expansion of tort claims 
after the fall of privity in MacPherson and the subsequent rise 
of strict products liability. Nor did either find the seeds within 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. (TWA),52 one 
of the first resisters, of what would become the formidable, ju-
dicially-created economic loss rule in products liability.  
 
 48. Id. at 878 (emphasis omitted). 
 49. Ken Abraham notes that Prosser showcased Spence as “bringing down 
the citadel” in the third edition of his treatise, published in 1964. See Abra-
ham, supra note 3, at 1835–36 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE 
LAW OF TORTS 677 (3d ed. 1964)). 
 50. Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 182 N.W.2d 800, 809 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1970). But see McGhee v. GMC Truck & Coach Div., 296 N.W.2d 286, 291 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (finding no liability “where the foundation of the rela-
tionship between the parties is contractual and no personal injury or damage 
to property other than the subject goods themselves is alleged”). Indeed, there 
is apparently a split of authority on this issue in Michigan courts. See Michels 
v. Monaco Coach Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 642, 650 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (noting 
that Michigan courts disagree as to whether privity retains its validity in the 
state). 
 51. Warren A. Seavey, Actions for Economic Harms, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1242, 1242 (1957); see also id. (“[O]nly within relatively modern times has [the 
common law] protected pecuniary interests divorced from tangible harm.”). 
 52. 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. 1955). 
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In hindsight, TWA was a significant harbinger of the eco-
nomic loss rule.53 The case involved “inferior engines” for a 
plane whose mechanics discovered the defects before there was 
an accident: 
The damage asserted by TWA is for replacement cost of allegedly in-
ferior engines—a matter of qualitative inadequacy in a product pur-
chased from Lockheed, a proper subject for a claim of breach of war-
ranty, pure and simple. It is true that when the engines “failed to 
operate,” the planes became “imminently dangerous”; but the danger 
was “averted.” There was no accident. The malfunctioning of the en-
gines had not yet turned into a misadventure.54 
The New York court held that privity was required for re-
covery when a negligently manufactured airplane engine re-
quired repair but had not caused any physical injury or proper-
ty damage. The court reasoned: 
If the ultimate user were allowed to sue the manufacturer in negli-
gence merely because an article with latent defects turned out to be 
bad when used in “regular service” without an accident occurring, 
there would be nothing left of the citadel of privity and not much scope 
for the law of warranty.55 
Moreover, the court continued: 
There seems . . . to be good reasoning for maintaining that, short of an 
accident, the citadel should be preserved. Manufacturers would be 
subject to indiscriminate lawsuits by persons having no contractual 
relations with them, persons who could thereby escape the limita-
 
 53. Nor did TWA stand alone. Prosser cited three other “resisters.” See 
Prosser, Assault, supra note 10, at 1103 & n.27; see also, e.g., Wyatt v. Cadillac 
Motor Car Div., 302 P.2d 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (holding privity was re-
quired for recovery when a negligently manufactured automobile had not 
caused any physical injury or property damage but required repair, reasoning 
that “[d]efendant’s duty was confined to the exercise of reasonable care to see 
that the car was so manufactured and assembled as to be free from defects 
which might be reasonably expected to produce bodily injury or damage to 
other property”); Lucette Originals, Inc. v. Gen. Cotton Converters, Inc., 185 
N.Y.S.2d 854 (App. Div. 1959) (holding privity required for negligently manu-
factured garments since product not inherently dangerous); A. J. P. Contract-
ing Corp. v. Brooklyn Builders Supply Co., 11 N.Y.S.2d 662, 664 (Sup. Ct. 
1939) (holding privity was required when a plaster wall needed repair due to 
building owner’s extraction of a defective lathe made by defendant on the 
ground that “the duty of the manufacturer for breach of which liability attach-
es runs only to those who suffer personal or property injury as a result of ei-
ther using or being within the vicinity of use of the dangerous instrumentali-
ty”), aff’d mem., 15 N.Y.S.2d 424 (App. Div. 1939), aff’d per curiam, 28 N.E.2d 
412 (N.Y. 1940). And Seavey cited, in addition, Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas 
Co., 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946). Seavey, supra note 51, at 1242 n.3 
(“[O]ne who causes economic loss to another by committing a tort upon a third, 
is not liable to the other unless he acted for the purpose of causing the loss.”). 
 54. Trans World Airlines, 148 N.Y.S.2d at 289–90. 
 55. Id. at 290 (emphasis added). 
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tions, if any, agreed upon in their contract of purchase. Damages for 
inferior quality, per se, should better be left to suits between vendors 
and purchasers since they depend on the terms of the bargain be-
tween them.56 
The court justified its embrace of privity with arguments 
based upon fear of boundless liability and deference to con-
tract—thereby foreshadowing two dominant justifications to 
emerge in defense of the economic loss rule in products liability 
cases.57 
B. THE RISE OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND EMERGENCE  
OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE  
Even after MacPherson ushered in the fall of privity, as 
George Priest has noted, “through the late 1950s and early 
1960s defective product cases were controlled by contract law 
with its privity requirement and, to a substantially lesser ex-
tent, by negligence law.”58 Moreover, as Prosser noted, “[a]ll but 
a few of the [negligence] cases . . . involved personal injuries.”59 
This perhaps best explains Prosser’s failure to discern the sig-
nificance of TWA and the cadre of other “resister” courts at that 
time. 
Though its seeds were planted long before, the economic 
loss rule in products emerged precisely at the moment when 
strict products liability threatened to dismantle entirely the 
contract-tort boundary line for cases involving defective prod-
ucts. The familiar tale of the rise of strict liability in products, 
from Justice Roger Traynor’s influential concurrence in Escola 
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,60 to the expansion of implied warran-
ty theory and elimination of privity of contract in Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors,61 to the full embrace of strict products liabil-
 
 56. Id. (emphasis added). 
 57. See infra Part II (discussing those justifications). 
 58. Priest, supra note 2, at 462. 
 59. Prosser, Assault, supra note 10, at 1143. 
 60. 150 P.2d 436, 461–68 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 61. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). Henningsen eliminated the requirement of 
privity of contract and thereby extended implied warranty of merchantability 
to the ultimate user of a product. The court held that the defendant automo-
bile manufacturer breached its implied warranty of merchantability when the 
wife of the purchaser of the automobile was injured when a defective steering 
wheel caused her to crash into a wall; moreover, the court refused to recognize 
as valid the manufacturer’s disclaimer of such liability in the contract of sale 
between the dealer and purchaser. Id. at 84 (“[W]e hold that under modern 
marketing conditions, when a manufacturer puts a new automobile in the 
stream of trade and promotes its purchase by the public, an implied warranty 
that it is reasonably suitable for use as such accompanies it into the hands of 
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ity in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.62 and the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 402A,63 will not be rehashed here. 
Instead, I will focus on the implications of the rise of strict 
products liability for the recovery of negligently inflicted eco-
nomic losses. 
My contention is that, at the very moment when strict lia-
bility replaces negligence in product defect cases, courts begin 
to look for ways to limit liability, where previously they had let 
the battle against privity proceed unchecked. In some jurisdic-
tions that had previously embraced the fall of privity across the 
board, I trace evidence of a retreat from negligence for purely 
economic losses. Prosser, moreover, comes to embrace (albeit 
tepidly) the emerging economic loss rule in products cases. 
With the rise of strict products liability and the widespread 
adoption of Second Restatement § 402A, privity’s “last bastion” 
holds firm, and its forces even retake some ground. 
1. Retreat from Negligence Liability for Economic Losses 
Mazetti—the first product defect case “which threw over-
board the bar of privity”64—stood as an early defender of the 
complete fall of privity, extending negligence claims to cover 
not only physical injuries but also purely financial losses. It is 
thus instructive to consider the fate of Mazetti after the rise of 
 
the ultimate purchaser.”). In a nutshell, Henningsen expanded the special 
rules as pertaining to food and drink to engulf all products. See Richard A. Ep-
stein, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law, 10 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2193, 2202 (1989) (“In essence, Henningsen, Greenman, and the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts reserved to the courts a legal monopoly to fashion the 
relevant terms and conditions on which all products should be sold in all rele-
vant markets.”).  
 62. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). In Greenman, the California Supreme Court 
“dispel[led] the confusion attending the recent development of strict manufac-
turer’s liability by grounding it explicitly in tort and abandoning the use of 
warranty concepts.” Note, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 
COLUM. L. REV. 916, 933 (1964). The court thereby drew a bright line between 
warranty-based recovery and tort recovery. 
 63. Prosser was the sole Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
As Ken Abraham recounts: 
During these years . . . Prosser prepared successive drafts that at-
tempted to capture the developing law on the subject. Finally, his 
1965 draft of § 402A of the Restatement provided that there was strict 
liability for injury caused by a product in a “defective condition, un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.” . . . [T]he fall of the 
citadel had begun, and it would be consummated across the country 
over the next decade. 
Abraham, supra note 3, at 1833. 
 64. Prosser, Fall, supra note 11, at 821–22. 
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strict products liability. In 1960, the Washington Supreme 
Court revisited Mazetti in Dimoff v. Ernie Majer, a false repre-
sentation case.65 The court purported to adhere to Mazetti—
specifically the exceptions to privity enumerated therein66—but 
declined to see a malfunctioning fuel line in a car as within any 
of the exceptions. And while Mazetti is distinguishable as a 
product case involving adulterated food, the Dimoff court re-
treated from the earlier court’s broader language implying ex-
tensive implied warranties when it denied strict liability for the 
false representation claim.67 Indeed, in The Assault upon the 
Citadel, Prosser noted that the fiction of implied warranty often 
creates strict liability for false representations, but mentioned 
that the Washington Supreme Court staunchly rejected such 
strict liability.68  
This retreat was rather subtle and, as later developments 
confirmed, only partial. In 1976, in Berg v. General Motors 
Corp., the Washington Supreme Court allowed a purchaser of 
goods to recover in negligence against a manufacturer for pure-
ly economic losses.69 In that case, a fishing boat broke down due 
to an error in assembly. The court reasoned that, so long as 
foreseeability is met, “there is nothing in the tort of negligence 
which prevents lost profits from being a species of 
recompensable harm which is actionable against the remote 
manufacturer.”70 The Berg decision was, nonetheless, short-
 
 65. 347 P.2d 1056 (Wash. 1960). Absent privity, the court rejected the 
plaintiff’s claim for economic damages stemming from the truck’s crimped fuel 
line, and dismissed any inference of negligence because the crimp was discov-
ered after 27,000 miles of driving. 
 66. The Dimoff court listed the following exceptions to privity enumerated 
in Mazetti:  
(1) Where the thing causing the injury is of a noxious or dangerous 
kind; (2) where the defendant has been guilty of fraud or deceit in 
passing off the article; and (3) where the defendant has been negli-
gent in some respect with reference to the sale or construction of a 
thing not imminently dangerous. 
Id. at 1059 (quoting Fleenor v. Erickson, 215 P.2d 885, 889 (Wash. 1950)). 
 67. Id. The court conceded that it would have found liability without priv-
ity under a theory of fraud, but held that the essential elements were not es-
tablished. Id. (“Fraud was not established . . . .”). Moreover, the court held that 
all express warranties were met while implied warranties were disclaimed. Id. 
at 1058. 
 68. Prosser, Assault, supra note 10, at 1134–37 (citing Dimoff, 347 P.2d 
1056). 
 69. 555 P.2d 818 (Wash. 1976). 
 70. Id. at 823 (“Each theory has a historical basis and should have its 
identity kept intact. ‘Privity’ as a limitation, only inheres in warranty. ‘Fore-
seeability’ as a limitation, only inheres in negligence. ‘Personal or property 
  
1860 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:1845 
 
lived. In 1981, the Washington Legislature “effectively over-
ruled” Berg with the enactment of the Washington Products Li-
ability Act (WPLA).71 As the Washington Supreme Court ex-
plained: “Under the WPLA, the Legislature specifically 
excluded recovery in tort for economic losses, deferring such 
claims instead to the Uniform Commercial Code.”72 
The retreat away from liability for purely financial losses 
in products cases takes place as the underlying theory of liabil-
ity for recovery morphs from negligence to strict liability. The 
requirement of negligence makes the ever-broadening excep-
tions to the privity barrier seem more palatable; once strict lia-
bility takes hold, however, the requirement of privity takes on 
greater significance as a means by which to restrict otherwise 
boundless liability. Consider, for instance, the justification pro-
vided by a California court in 1958 in Fentress v. Van Etta Mo-
tors, when it declined to apply privity to bar an action where a 
defective product caused injury only to itself (i.e., not damaging 
any other property).73 The court emphasized that, by removing 
privity, it would not thereby “make the manufacturer a war-
rantor to the ultimate purchaser” because “negligence must be 
proved.”74 Prosser, likewise, at that time seemed at ease with 
recovery in cases of physical damage to the product, writing in 
The Assault upon the Citadel that the privity requirement did 
not hold “where there is physical damage to the chattel itself, 
as where an automobile is wrecked because of bad brakes, [and] 
recovery is allowed.”75  
 
damage’ as a limitation only inheres in strict liability.”). Moreover, the court 
reasoned, “[a] distinction that would allow recovery if the product in question 
destroyed the property of another, yet would deny recovery were the same 
product merely to disintegrate, is a specious one.” Id. at 822. 
 71. Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 881 P.2d 
986, 990 (Wash. 1994). 
 72. Id. 
 73. 323 P.2d 227 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1958) (holding privity not re-
quired even when the negligently manufactured product was not inherently 
dangerous but an accident resulted). 
 74. Id. at 229. 
 75. Prosser, Assault, supra note 10, at 1103 n.27. In addition to Fentress, 
Prosser cites Quackenbush, International Harvester, and C.D. Herme as exam-
ples of cases allowing recovery for purely economic loss damages when a chat-
tel damages itself. Id. (citing Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 153 N.Y.S. 131 
(App. Div. 1915) (holding privity not required to recover for repair to car 
caused by negligently manufactured brakes that resulted in a car crashing); 
Int’l Harvester Co. v. Sharoff, 202 F.2d 52 (10th Cir. 1953) (holding privity not 
required to recover for tractor-trailer which overturned due to component de-
fect); C.D. Herme, Inc. v. R. C. Tway Co., 294 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1956) (holding 
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Note the contrast with East River Steamship Corp. v. 
Transamerica Delaval Inc.—the canonical 1985 U.S. Supreme 
Court case that established the “other property” limitation on 
recovery for physical damage in admiralty product defect cas-
es.76 More specifically, East River Steamship established that a 
plaintiff cannot recover for physical damage a defective product 
causes to itself; but it made clear that this limitation on liabil-
ity did not extend to damage caused to “other property.”77 In 
setting forth the limitation, the Court explained: “[A]ll but the 
very simplest of machines have component parts, [thus, a con-
trary] holding would require a finding of ‘property damage’ in 
virtually every case where a product damages itself. Such a 
holding would eliminate the distinction between warranty and 
strict products liability.”78 
The most significant shift from 1958 (when Fentress was 
decided) to 1985 (when East River Steamship was decided) was 
the rise of strict products liability and the vast expansion of 
product defect claims in tort.79 Indeed, the Fentress court an-
chored its holding allowing manufacturer liability for economic 
losses, absent privity, to the necessity to prove negligence.80 
Once negligence is replaced by strict liability, the fear that the 
 
privity not required to recover for repair to a trailer caused by negligently 
manufactured kingpin (connector) which resulted in damage to trailer and 
cargo)).  
Prosser may have overstated the significance of these cases. These cases 
involve injury not just to the product itself, but also other property. For exam-
ple, C.D. Herme involved damage to the product (a semi-trailer) and its cargo. 
294 S.W.2d at 536. Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in East River 
Steamship, few courts paid much attention to this distinction. Moreover, the 
test articulated in C.D. Herme focused on the manufacturer being liable if its 
negligence creates “an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to those who 
lawfully use it,” and the manufacturer should be liable even if “the actual inju-
ry in the particular case happen to be to property only.” Id. at 537. This 
evolved into the intermediate position that allowed recovery when a product 
injures only itself in certain circumstances—a position the Supreme Court lat-
er deemed “unsatisfactory.” E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 
476 U.S. 858, 869–70 (1986). 
 76. 476 U.S. at 870–71. East River Steamship is discussed further below. 
See infra Part II.B. 
 77. 476 U.S. at 867. 
 78. Id. (quoting N. Power & Eng’g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 
P.2d 324, 330 (Alaska 1981)). 
 79. For discussion of another significant development, the adoption of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, see infra Part II.B.2. 
 80. Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 323 P.2d 227, 229 (Cal. App. Dep’t Su-
per. Ct. 1958) (“To accept the rule of the Quackenbush case will not make the 
manufacturer a warrantor to the ultimate purchaser. In the first place, negli-
gence must be proved . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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manufacturer would become “a warrantor to the ultimate pur-
chaser” rears its head, and the economic loss rule provides the 
means by which contract-based warranty claims are kept dis-
tinct from tort-based strict products liability. 
2. Privity’s Last Bastion  
Prosser’s view of product defect claims involving purely fi-
nancial losses evolves ever so slightly by the time of The Fall of 
the Citadel in 1966. First, he distinguishes among three catego-
ries of damages (today, all recognized as purely economic loss-
es): (1) damage caused to the purchased chattel from an acci-
dent created by its own defect, “as where an automobile is 
wrecked by reason of its own bad brakes;”81 (2) consequential 
commercial losses, such as lost profits;82 and (3) a defective or 
disappointing product, i.e., “mere loss on the bargain, which is 
to say that the product which the plaintiff has received is only 
worth less than the price he has paid for it.”83 According to 
Prosser, the “difficulty” when it comes to pecuniary losses con-
cerns this third “loss on the bargain” category.84 He then sub-
divides cases concerning “loss on the bargain” into two then-
emerging camps: a “small majority” of cases that denied strict 
liability;85 and three cases that permitted liability.86  
 
 81. Prosser, Fall, supra note 11, at 820–21. This position is supported by 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 148 N.Y.S.2d 284, 290 
(Sup. Ct. 1955), which held that for a defective product, the only remedy is to 
sue under breach of warranty unless “the danger inherent in a defectively 
made article causes an accident”—only then can a negligence claim of action 
be sustained. Prosser describes this category as a chattel causing damage to 
other property, not resulting in a purely pecuniary loss. Prosser, Fall, supra 
note 11, at 821. However, he does note, without any discussion, that dicta in 
Seely overrules one of the cases allowing for this kind of recovery. See id. at 
821 n.164. And in fact, Seely’s logic forecloses the “damage to the purchased 
chattel itself” category. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).  
 82. Prosser, Fall, supra note 11, at 821–22. He labels as pecuniary losses 
both consequential damages and “indirect physical harm to other property,” 
such as a batch of dough being ruined by glass in one of the ingredients. Id. He 
cites several cases allowing for recovery, but again mentions in a footnote that 
Seely would seem to stand against allowing recovery in tort for these kinds of 
losses as well. Id. at 822 n.165. 
 83. Id. at 822. 
 84. Id. at 821–22 (“Pecuniary loss, mere pocketbook damage, offers more 
difficulties. . . . The difficulty concerns mere loss on the bargain . . . .”). Prosser 
mostly approves (or simply assumes) that recovery in the first two aforemen-
tioned categories is desirable and accepted by most courts. Id. at 822–23.  
 85. Id. at 822 n.169 (citing Dennis v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 111 F. 
Supp. 875 (W.D. Mo. 1953); Seely, 403 P.2d 145; Inglis v. Am. Motors Corp., 
197 N.E.2d 921 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964), aff’d on other grounds, 209 N.E.2d 583 
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Finally, Prosser adopts a tentative normative position: 
“[D]enial would appear to be the sounder rule.”87 According to 
Prosser, given that the “[l]oss on the bargain must depend upon 
what the bargain is,” and it is “a matter properly between the 
purchaser and dealer,” liability should be denied.88 However, he 
tries to define “loss on the bargain” narrowly, to mean only “the 
product which the plaintiff has received is only worth less than 
the price he has paid for it.”89 
Significant for my purposes here, Prosser then reframes 
the cases he cited earlier in The Assault upon the Citadel as 
lone hold-outs against the fall of privity in negligence as strong 
evidence that, even when a manufacturer was liable under neg-
ligence, courts denied recovery for certain purely financial loss-
es.90 Prosser does not explain why what he described in The As-
sault upon the Citadel as “a refusal on the part of a few courts,” 
 
(Ohio 1965); Price v. Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502 (Or. 1965); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 
398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966); Kyker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 381 S.W.2d 884 
(Tenn. 1964)). 
 86. Id. at 822 n.170 (citing Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc. v. E. 
C. “Red” Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)); Santor v. 
A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965); Lang v. General Motors 
Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965)). As aptly summarized by the court in Con-
tinental Copper: 
The general rule that an ultimate purchaser may not sue the whole-
saler is not an absolute one and it seems to be losing force with the 
passage of time. “There is a conflict of opinion regarding the account-
ability of a manufacturer to a consumer on the theory of implied war-
ranty in the absence of privity, but this court has become aligned with 
those courts holding that suit may be brought against the manufac-
turer notwithstanding want of privity.” It appears that the courts 
have departed from the general rule that recovery could not be had 
from a manufacturer on an implied warranty absent privity of con-
tract. 
104 So. 2d at 41 (quoting Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514, 515 
(Fla. 1953)). 
 87. Prosser, Fall, supra note 11, at 822–23. 
 88. Id. at 823. 
 89. Id. at 822. The policy rationales underlying this category had nonethe-
less already begun to spread to the first two categories of cases, and would 
lead directly to the modern economic loss rule. See, e.g., Karl’s Shoe Stores, 
Ltd. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 145 F. Supp. 376, 377 (D. Mass. 1956) (“No 
case has been found in which a manufacturer has been held liable where no 
personal injury or physical injury to property was involved, and the plaintiff’s 
only complaint was of financial damage such as loss of business, revenue and 
good will.”); Seely, 403 P.2d at 151 (discussing how a consumer cannot recover 
in tort for purely economic losses, but only for physical harm to person or 
property). 
 90. Prosser, Fall, supra note 11, at 822–23 (discussing how recovery has 
been denied in these cases even when the manufacturer has been proven neg-
ligent). 
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(such as TWA)91 to embrace the fall of privity across the board 
now supports the majority position.92 But it is clear that what 
changed within the span of six years separating Prosser’s two 
articles was the rapid expansion and growth of strict products 
liability and an appreciation of privity’s “last bastion,” i.e., 
product defect claims involving purely financial losses.  
The economic loss rule for products liability thus emerges 
to protect this last bastion of privity. It is codified in the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 402A, which holds sellers of prod-
ucts only strictly liable for physical harm caused to a consumer 
or his property for a defective product regardless of care or 
privity.93 By doing so it barred recovery in tort for all three cat-
egories of economic loss if not accompanied by physical injury 
or damage to other property.94 
The economic loss rule’s evolution towards covering dam-
ages from all three categories discussed by Prosser can be seen 
in Prosser’s own Casebook. By 1971, Prosser’s Torts Casebook 
(with Wade) describes cases as falling primarily into the camp 
of denying strict liability for purely financial losses.95 While dis-
cerning “nothing about the nature of pecuniary loss to prevent 
recovery,” Prosser now frames the issue (as in The Fall of the 
 
 91. Prosser, Assault, supra note 10, at 1103 & n.27. 
 92. Prosser, Fall, supra note 11, at 822–23. 
 93. The Restatement comments discuss the extension of strict liability be-
yond the sellers of food to other products intended for intimate bodily use, and 
then “of any product which, if it should prove to be defective, may be expected 
to cause physical harm to the consumer or his property.” RESTATEMENT (SE-
COND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Herbert Titus argues 
that Prosser drafted § 402A (heavily influenced by Justice Traynor) to oppose 
the majority approach of dealing with liability through theories of warranty 
and contract. Herbert W. Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A 
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713, 726 (1970) (arguing 
that the history of the Uniform Sales Act and products cases from England 
through 1960 suggested contract and privity were key to the concept of war-
ranty). But the triumph of strict liability in tort was not complete.  
Baz Edmeades criticizes § 402A from the other direction, as a “truncated 
restatement of the effect of these cases since it excludes liability for economic 
loss and retreats from the strictness of warranty liability.” Edmeades, supra 
note 26, at 649–50. According to Edmeades, the adoption of § 402A “was a re-
jection of implied warranty and economic loss recovery founded upon faulty 
analysis and questionable case authority.” Id. at 663.  
 94. See Edmeades, supra note 26, at 652 (lamenting that following § 402A, 
“economic loss claims have been denied . . . even where the defect in question 
threatens physical harm or personal injury in addition to rendering the chattel 
unusable”). 
 95. WILLIAM L. PROSSER & JOHN W. WADE, TORTS CASES AND MATERIALS 
736 (5th ed. 1971). 
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Citadel) as the potential for recovery “as to mere loss of the 
bargain,” a loss that can occur even when goods are in no way 
defective.96 Prosser now aligns with many courts refusing re-
covery on theories of implied warranty or strict liability, and 
recognizes “recovery for loss of the bargain” only via express 
warranty.97 Thereafter, Prosser’s book took a sharper turn to-
ward deference to contract rationales and, in the 1976 edition, 
stated that the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs de-
fects that destroy the product itself.98 By the 1984 version of the 
Prosser and Keeton on Torts hornbook, the economic loss rule 
had taken hold, and the UCC is described therein as the “exclu-
sive source for ascertaining when a seller is subject to liability 
for damages if the claim is based on intangible economic loss 
not attributable to physical injury to person or harm to a tangi-
ble thing other than the defective product itself.”99 
II.  THE “SEPARATE SPHERES” OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
AND CONTRACT LAW   
The two decades that followed The Fall of the Citadel wit-
nessed the unfolding of the debate over the economic loss rule 
in products cases, as it was framed by the opposing positions 
taken by a pair of cases decided in 1965: the New Jersey Su-
preme Court in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.100 and the 
California Supreme Court in Seely v. White Motor Co.101 
Santor and Seely set the key terms of the debate on the 
economic loss rule in products. Santor involved a suit to recover 
the cost of carpeting sold as Grade #1 by the manufacturer.102 
After the retailer installed the carpet in the plaintiff’s home, an 
 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, JOHN W. WADE & VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, TORTS 
CASES AND MATERIALS 800 (6th ed. 1976). The book distinguishes Santor (and 
like cases) as cases that existed “prior to the time the UCC was in force in the 
state and there was no apparent conflict with any provision of the Uniform 
Sales Act.” Id. at 800–01.  
 99. WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
TORTS 680 (5th ed. 1984); see id. (“[I]nsofar as liability for economic losses are 
concerned, it would appear that the obligations of warranty law have been ob-
ligations imposed on the basis of express or implied promises or express or im-
plied representations by the seller . . . . [I]t should be so in order to make an 
intelligible distinction between contractual obligations and tortious obliga-
tions.”). 
 100. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965). 
 101. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965). 
 102. Santor, 207 A.2d at 306. 
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“unusual line” was discovered in it, and since the retailer had 
gone out of business, the plaintiff located the manufacturer, 
who admitted the carpet provided to the retailer had been 
manufactured defectively.103 The New Jersey Supreme Court 
held that a manufacturer can be strictly liable for damage to a 
product, even where the losses are purely financial, here, lim-
ited to the loss of value of defective carpeting.104 The court 
staked out the position that there was no just cause for recogni-
tion of the existence of an implied warranty of merchantability 
and a right to recovery for breach thereof regardless of lack of 
privity of the claimant in the one case and the exclusion of re-
covery in the other simply because loss of value of the article 
sold is the only damage resulting from the breach.105 
Indeed, the court cites Prosser for support of the proposi-
tion that there is no sensible reason for distinguishing between 
personal injury and property damage.106 According to the court: 
“[C]onsiderations of justice require a court to interest itself in 
originating causes and to apply the principle of implied war-
ranty on that basis, rather than to test its application by 
whether the personal injury or simply loss of bargain resulted 
from the breach of warranty.”107 Moreover, for the court, again 
favorably citing Prosser for support, it did not make sense to 
forge an artificial divide between contract and tort given that 
the manufacturer’s duty “bespeaks a sui generis cause of action. 
Its character is hybrid, having its commencement in contract 
and its termination in tort.”108  
Just four months later, Justice Traynor fired back by writ-
ing the Seely decision.109 Seely marks the restriction of strict li-
ability in product cases when the product only harms itself. The 
case involved a defective truck purchased by the consumer that 
overturned and was damaged. The plaintiff sued and claimed 
damages from disappointed expectations for the value of the 
truck, lost profits, and damage to the truck caused by the acci-
 
 103. Id. at 306–07. 
 104. Id. at 314. 
 105. See id. at 309. 
 106. Id. at 310 (“[W]e approve Dean Prosser’s comment that there is no 
sensible reason for distinguishing in such cases between personal injury and 
property damage claims.” (citing Prosser, Assault, supra note 10, at 1143)). 
 107. Id. at 309. 
 108. Id. at 311. The court elaborated: “[T]he law has imposed on manufac-
turers a duty to such persons irrespective of contract or a privity relationship 
between them.” Id. 
 109. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965). 
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dent. The court held that a manufacturer could not be held 
strictly liable in tort for purely economic losses.110 In this con-
text, outside the realm of physical injuries, the court recognized 
a strong deference to contract rationale, highlighting the exist-
ence of the UCC and its codification by the state legislature as 
a superior method for dealing with a bargain between two par-
ties.  
Thus, under Seely, a plaintiff (often a consumer) does not 
have a tort action when she has suffered purely financial losses 
from a defective product. Instead, she may have a contractual 
remedy against the seller and/or the manufacturer for breach of 
an express or implied warranty. In Seely, the plaintiff was able 
to recover against the manufacturer because the court found 
that it had expressly warranted the truck would be free from 
defects.111 However, as Seely makes clear, if the seller had sold 
the good “as is” (disclaiming all warranties) then the buyer 
would have had no contractual or tort remedy for her purely 
economic losses.112 
Two decades later, in 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court sided 
with Seely in a common law maritime case, East River Steam-
ship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.113 In East River 
Steamship, the defendant manufactured defective turbines, 
which, once installed by the shipbuilder in the supertankers 
leased by the plaintiffs, malfunctioned. As a result, the plaintiff 
supertanker charterers lost significant income and sued the de-
 
 110. Id. at 147. Ironically, everything in the opinion concerning economic 
losses and tort was dicta. The court affirmed the trial court’s award of damag-
es for lost profit and money paid towards the purchase price of the truck to the 
plaintiff under an express warranty claim. Id. at 148. It also affirmed the trial 
court’s denial of awarding damages for the truck’s repair because the plaintiff 
did not prove that the defect caused the accident. Id. at 148, 152. Justice Pe-
ters penned a forceful dissent, arguing that “[t]he nature of the damage sus-
tained by the plaintiff is immaterial, so long as it proximately flowed from the 
defect. What is important is not the nature of the damage but the relative 
roles played by the parties to the purchase contract and the nature of their 
transaction.” Id. at 153 (Peters, J., dissenting); see also Marc A. Franklin, 
When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product 
Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974, 978 (1966) (“For Peters, the crucial question was 
whether the relation is a ‘commercial’ sale, in which case sales law should con-
trol, or a sale to an ultimate consumer, in which case tort law would control. 
Peters claimed this test was more rational than Traynor’s test of type of harm 
suffered.”). 
 111. Seely, 403 P.2d at 148. 
 112. Id. at 150 (“Had defendant not warranted the truck, but sold it ‘as is,’ 
it should not be liable for the failure of the truck to serve plaintiff’s business 
needs.”). 
 113. 476 U.S. 858 (1986). 
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fendant manufacturer in tort, based on a products liability the-
ory.114 The Court framed the question as: “[C]harting a course 
between products liability and contract law, we must determine 
whether injury to a product itself is the kind of harm that 
should be protected by products liability or left entirely to the 
law of contracts.”115 The Court acknowledged that warranty law 
was insufficient to deal with physical injury, noting that we 
impose liability in tort for products “because ‘public policy de-
mands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effec-
tively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defec-
tive products that reach the market.’”116 And, indeed, without 
much elaboration, the court suggested that this tort law protec-
tion extends to property damage as well: “For similar reasons of 
safety, the manufacturer’s duty of care was broadened to in-
clude protection against property damage.”117 But the Court 
held that “a commercial product injuring itself is [not] the kind 
of harm against which public policy requires manufacturers to 
protect, independent of any contractual obligation.”118 
While Santor represented the minority position in the de-
bate, it did attract support from several courts.119 But, accord-
 
 114. The initial complaint had also listed the shipbuilder as a plaintiff who 
alleged breach of contract and warranty as well as tort claims. However, the 
manufacturer raised a statute of limitations defense, after which the charter-
ers alone proceeded with the suit in tort. Id. at 861. The charterers could not 
assert warranty claims. Id. at 875. But, according to the Court, “[e]ven so, the 
charterers should be left to the terms of their bargains, which explicitly allo-
cated the cost of repairs.” Id. 
 115. Id. at 859. 
 116. Id. at 866 (quoting Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 
P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)).  
 117. Id. at 867. The Court cites Marsh Products v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 
which stated, where the article, if negligently manufactured, will be immi-
nently dangerous to human safety, liability should extend to property damage 
in all cases where a causal connection can be established. Id. (citing 240 N.W. 
392, 399 (Wis. 1932)). 
 118. Id. at 866; id. at 871 (“[W]e . . . hold that a manufacturer in a commer-
cial relationship has no duty under either a negligence or strict products-
liability theory to prevent a product from injuring itself.”). 
 119. A majority of the Courts of Appeals sitting in admiralty adopted the 
rule in Santor over Seely on the ground that “the safety and insurance ration-
ales behind strict liability apply equally where the losses are purely economic.” 
Id. at 869 (citing Emerson G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Alaskan Enter., 732 F.2d 1468 
(9th Cir. 1984)). Outside of admiralty, Santor likewise garnered some support. 
See, e.g., Alaskan Oil, Inc. v. Central Flying Serv., Inc., 975 F.2d 553, 555 (8th 
Cir. 1992) (“Arkansas law permits recovery under strict liability even when 
the only damages sustained are to the defective product itself.” (citing Berke-
ley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 653 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Ark. 1983) (dis-
cussing how in dicta they approved of Santor, and they see “no need to review 
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ing to the U.S. Supreme Court, “[t]he [Santor] view fails to ac-
count for the need to keep products liability and contract law in 
separate spheres and to maintain a realistic limitation on dam-
ages.”120 And ultimately, the Court declined to let contract law 
“drown in a sea of tort,”121 which heavily influenced the devel-
opment of state court jurisprudence on the economic loss rule.122 
This Part explores various justifications raised by Seely 
and East River Steamship for why some privity restrictions re-
lating to product defect torts survived the products liability 
revolution of the 1960s in the form of the economic loss rule. 
A. FLOODGATES 
The Seely court raised a concern that liability imposed by 
law, that could not be disclaimed, would open the manufacturer 
to unknown and unlimited damages.123 Specifically, if a manu-
facturer could not limit “the scope of his responsibility for harm 
caused by his products” he “would be liable for damages of un-
known and unlimited scope.”124 Or, in more colorful language: 
“Where there is no privity . . . there is concern that liability im-
posed upon the remote manufacturer will result in unanticipat-
 
that choice” when it came to parties recovering damages for economic losses 
for a product in a defective condition))); Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 
465 F. Supp. 355, 363–66 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (commercial buyer allowed to re-
cover under strict liability in tort for direct and indirect economic losses due to 
defective steam turbine); Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 182 N.W.2d 800, 
804 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (owners of golf course may recover against manufac-
turer in strict liability in tort for direct and indirect economic losses resulting 
from defects in golf carts); Iacano v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 326 N.E.2d 267, 
271 (Ohio 1975) (homeowner permitted to maintain an action in tort for dam-
age to concrete driveway due to defective materials and workmanship); City of 
La Crosse v. Schubert, 240 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Wis. 1976) (manufacturer of de-
fective roofing materials may be liable for loss of value of roof under strict lia-
bility in tort, and, in dicta, consequential economic damages are also recovera-
ble). 
 120. E. River, 476 U.S. at 870–71.  
 121. Id. at 866. 
 122. Though the words “economic loss doctrine” are nowhere to be found in 
East River Steamship, the case is seminal to the development of the doctrine. 
See Mark Geistfeld, Economic Loss, Endangered Consumers, and the Error of 
East River Steamship, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 
2–4) (on file with author).  
 123. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 150–51 (Cal. 1965).  
 124. Id. at 151; see also Friedrich Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 
887, 892 (1967) (“Properly understood, privity is only a means of protecting a 
party guilty of a breach against losses suffered by remote parties which are 
unanticipated and therefore not included in the calculation of costs.”). 
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ed and extensive economic losses which may kill an otherwise 
useful goose who lays an occasional unmerchantable egg.”125 
This echoed the earlier concern raised by the TWA court 
that abandoning privity could “hamper the enterprising manu-
facturer whose ingenuity was the chief factor in causing the 
economy to expand” by exposing him to unpredictable and po-
tentially unlimited losses.126 Moreover, it is a thread continued 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in East River Steamship: “Permit-
ting recovery for all foreseeable claims for purely economic loss 
could make a manufacturer liable for vast sums. It would be 
difficult for a manufacturer to take into account the expecta-
tions of persons downstream who may encounter its product.”127 
The Court states that “a realistic limitation on damages” must 
be maintained and highlights that “[a] warranty action also has 
a built-in limitation on liability, whereas a tort action could 
subject the manufacturer to damages of an indefinite 
amount.”128 
The concern dates back to Winterbottom v. Wright—the ca-
nonical case representing the strength of the privity barrier in 
the nineteenth century—where Lord Abinger warns that any 
plaintiff injured in any capacity by the product may be able to 
sue, leading to “the most absurd and outrageous consequences, 
to which I can see no limit.”129 Other lords echoed this view, 
fearing that otherwise no limiting principle could be devised.130  
The floodgates concern is by no means unique to the realm 
of economic losses due to defective products. Indeed, it is a 
common fear whenever a tort right is expanded.131 The thrust of 
 
 125. Richard E. Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity 
Requirement: Once More into the Void, 67 B.U. L. REV. 9, 24 (1987). 
 126. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 148 N.Y.S.2d 284, 
287, 290 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (citing this as a long-standing justification for privity 
and later defending privity and the citadel as needing to be preserved in this 
area to protect the manufacturer from “indiscriminate lawsuits”). 
 127. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 874 
(1986).  
 128. Id. at 871, 874. 
 129. (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405; 10 M. & W. 109, 114. 
 130. Baron Edward Hall Alderson warned that if this action was allowed, 
“there is no point at which such actions would stop.” Id.  
 131. Consider, for example, the birth of the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. See William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental 
Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 875–78 (1939), for a discussion 
about the difficulty of quantifying damages, and how “the most valid objection 
to the protection” of emotional interests would be “the ‘wide door’ which might 
be opened, not only to fictitious and fraudulent claims, but to litigation in the 
field of trivialities and mere bad manners.” However, Prosser later says “this 
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the floodgates concern is typically dealt with via proximate 
cause limitations; seen in this light, it does not provide the 
strongest rationale for acoustic separation of tort and contract 
law.132 The concern of contract “drowning in a sea of tort,” by 
contrast, moves the debate from the default of no liability in the 
absence of tort to the default of contract-based liability. 
B. CONTRACT “DROWNING IN A SEA OF TORT” 
In East River Steamship, the U.S. Supreme Court worried 
about the prospect of contract law “drown[ing] in a sea of tort” 
in considering “whether a commercial product injuring itself is 
the kind of harm against which public policy requires manufac-
turers to protect, independent of any contract[].”133 The Court 
held that “a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no 
duty under either a negligence or strict products-liability theo-
ry to prevent a product from injuring itself.”134 Why? The law of 
warranty is better suited to address plaintiff’s contractual dis-
appointments, and the Court preferred warranty law’s “built-in 
limitation on liability.”135 The Court also wanted to protect a 
manufacturer from worrying about “the expectations of persons 
downstream who may encounter its product.”136 TWA had ex-
pressed a similar concern, fearing that by allowing claims in 
tort “there would be nothing left of the citadel of privity and not 
much scope for the law of warranty.”137  
To be sure, as a descriptive matter, the economic loss rule 
operates in this realm as the dividing line between tort and 
contract. But we must probe more deeply to uncover the norma-
tive justification for the existence of these separate spheres and 
the urge to stave off contract’s “drowning” in tort. As products 
 
is a poor reason for denying recovery for any genuine, serious mental injury” 
and the law can and should find a way to separate out worthy claims from the 
unworthy. Id. at 877. 
 132. Moreover, the floodgates rationale has particular force in non-
contractual settings, where there is no way for the tortfeasor to recover the 
costs of tort liability. In contractual settings, by contrast, the manufactur-
er/seller can pass on the increased costs of liability to purchaser/consumer vic-
tims—at least under certain assumptions regarding competitive markets and 
fully informed purchasers/consumers. And, as Mark Geistfeld has explained, 
this returns us to the contracting rationale for determining the scope of duty.  
 133. E. River, 476 U.S. at 866. 
 134. Id. at 871. 
 135. Id. at 874. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 148 N.Y.S.2d 284, 
290 (Sup. Ct. 1955). 
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cases moved from contracts to torts, courts began to recognize a 
pressing need to prevent tort law from “swallowing” the law of 
contracts.  
1. Essence of Tort and Contract 
One way of understanding the concern about contract los-
ing itself in tort is the need to preserve a boundary between the 
separate “essences” of tort and contract.138 As summed up in 
Seely, “[a]lthough the rules of warranty frustrate rational com-
pensation for physical injury, they function well in a commer-
cial setting.”139  
On this view, the “core” of tort law is to protect the public 
from physical injury—primarily to persons, but also to proper-
ty. More specifically, the original justification for the extension 
of strict liability to product defect cases centered on protecting 
the public from physical injuries arising from dangerous prod-
ucts.140 In Seely, Justice Traynor—who authored the seminal 
Greenman decision introducing strict products liability for 
 
 138. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Louisville v. Brooks Farms, 821 S.W.2d 
925, 930 (Tenn. 1991) (“[A] line must be drawn between contract actions in 
which the basis of the plaintiff’s complaint is that he failed to receive the qual-
ity of product expected; and tort actions, the basis of which is that the plaintiff 
has been exposed, through a hazardous product, to an unreasonable risk of in-
jury to person or property.” (quoting 4 AM. L. PRODS. LIAB. § 60:20 (3d. 1987))). 
 139. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 150 (Cal. 1965) (citing 
Prosser, Assault, supra note 10, at 1130, 1133). “Commercially a disclaimer 
may not be at all an unreasonable thing, particularly where the seller does not 
know the quality of what he is selling and the buyer is willing to take his 
chances. Commercial buyers are usually quite able to protect themselves.” 
Prosser, Assault, supra note 10, at 1133. Neither the Seely court nor Prosser 
elaborate on the significance of this passage—which, I argue below, contains 
seeds of a “cheapest cost avoider” argument. See infra notes 190–98 and ac-
companying text. 
 140. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 
(Cal. 1963) (“The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries 
resulting from defective products are borne by manufacturers that put such 
products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless 
to protect themselves.”); see also Speidel, supra note 125, at 23 (“Strict prod-
ucts liability evolved in response to concerns about safety, difficulties in prov-
ing negligence, and the alleged imbalance in the capacities of enterprises and 
individuals to detect product defects and to bear and distribute the resulting 
damage to person or property. Strict products liability does not depend upon 
representations by the seller; its emphasis upon power imbalance and loss dis-
tribution collides with the traditional assumptions that underlie exchange 
transactions, namely, that the parties have relatively equal capacities and 
should be held to both their selection of contracting partners and their alloca-
tion of the risk of unknown product conditions.”). 
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product defect cases141—distinguished this prior holding as lim-
ited to the distinct problem of physical injury: “The history of 
the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was de-
signed, not to undermine the warranty provisions of the sales 
act or of the Uniform Commercial Code but, rather, to govern 
the distinct problem of physical injuries.”142 
Justice Traynor explained that prior strict products liabil-
ity cases were concerned with loss spreading as it related to 
bodily injuries, but not loss spreading for every harm.143 Accord-
ing to Justice Traynor, insuring persons against the over-
whelming misfortune of a bodily injury is justified and “the risk 
of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed 
among the public as a cost of doing business.”144  
But this is very different from forcing the public to pay 
more so that if every product does not meet every business ex-
pectation of every purchaser, that purchaser will be insured. As 
Justice Traynor explained in Seely: “[The] rationale [for extend-
ing tort to cover economic losses] in no way justifies requiring 
the consuming public to pay more for their products so that a 
manufacturer can insure against the possibility that some of 
his products will not meet the business needs of some of his 
customers.”145 To hold otherwise would destroy the value of con-
tracting about risk. Contract, at its core, protects economic ex-
pectations. And the consumer can “be fairly charged with the 
risk that the product will not match his economic expectations 
unless the manufacturer agrees that it will.”146 
In sum, Justice Traynor argued that a space for contract-
ing should be preserved because it often functions better than 
tort in a commercial setting.147 Subsequent courts have echoed 
this rationale. For example, the Oregon Supreme Court in 1965 
(citing Seely) reasoned that “the social and economic reasons 
which courts elsewhere have given for extending enterprise lia-
bility to the victims of physical injury are not equally persua-
sive in a case of a disappointed buyer of personal property.”148 
 
 141. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 898. 
 142. Seely, 403 P.2d at 149. 
 143. Id. at 151. 
 144. Id. (citing Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 
441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)). 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 150. 
 148. Price v. Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502, 503 (Or. 1965); see also id. at 503–04 
(Holman, J., concurring) (arguing that courts distinguish between economic 
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And the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1970 (citing Seely) also 
concurred, stating: “The laws of warranty still meet the needs 
of commercial transactions and function well in a commercial 
setting. However, the Restatement theory of responsibility more 
adequately meets the public policy need to protect consumers 
from the inevitable risks of bodily harm created by mass pro-
duction and complex marketing conditions.”149 
The U.S. Supreme Court picked up this rationale in East 
River Steamship, when it concluded that “[d]amage to a product 
itself is most naturally understood as a warranty claim.”150 The 
Court elaborated: 
Such damage means simply that the product has not met the custom-
er’s expectations, or, in other words, that the customer has received 
“insufficient product value.” The maintenance of product value and 
quality is precisely the purpose of express and implied warranties. 
Therefore, a claim of a nonworking product can be brought as a 
breach-of-warranty action. Or, if the customer prefers, it can reject 
the product or revoke its acceptance and sue for breach of contract.151 
In sum, according to the Court, “the injury suffered—the 
failure of the product to function properly—is the essence of a 
warranty action, through which a contracting party can seek to 
recoup the benefit of its bargain.”152 And even if, in some cases, 
tort and contract principles may overlap, “the main currents of 
tort law run in different directions from those of contract and 
warranty, and the latter seem to us far more appropriate for 
commercial disputes of the kind involved here.”153 
In other words, as the Court reiterated in its subsequent 
Saratoga Fishing case, “the courts should not ask tort law to 
 
harms and other harms for social reasons—namely that personal injury cases 
involve “a personal disaster of major proportions to the [harmed] individual,” 
whereas when it comes to pure economic losses, “the damaged person’s health, 
and therefore his basic earning capacity, has remained unimpaired” and there 
is less of a social necessity in providing compensation).  
 149. Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 179 N.W.2d 64, 71 (Minn. 1970) (cita-
tion omitted); accord Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 
360 F. Supp. 25, 32 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (“The doctrine of strict liability in tort, 
designed to aid the consumer in an unequal bargaining position who is physi-
cally injured, loses all meaning when a large public utility or other large com-
pany is the plaintiff and is suing solely for commercial loss.”); Geistfeld, supra 
note 122 (arguing that instead of defining the economic loss rule in terms of 
the damage caused, the focus should be on the risk of physical harm posed to 
the consumer).  
 150. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872 
(1986). 
 151. Id. (citation omitted). 
 152. Id. at 868 (emphasis added). 
 153. Id. at 873 n.8. 
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perform a job that contract law might perform better.”154 But 
what precisely falls within the wheelhouse of contract or war-
ranty law and outside of tort?  
In Saratoga Fishing, the Court made clear that the “mere 
possibility” of contracting by no means precludes tort liabil-
ity.155 In Saratoga Fishing, a shipbuilder sold a fishing vessel 
with a defective hydraulic system to an initial user, who added 
equipment to the vessel and then sold it to a subsequent pur-
chaser.156 While in use by the subsequent purchaser, the vessel 
caught fire and sank due in large part to the defective hydrau-
lic system, and destroyed the added equipment.157 The Court 
held that the added equipment was “other property,” and the 
economic loss rule does not cover damage to other property.158  
The Court rejected the argument that the initial user 
should have been expected to offer a warranty to the subse-
quent purchaser for the items the initial user added to the ves-
sel.159 According to the Court, unlike the situation in East River 
Steamship, warranty law (even if theoretically available) was 
 
 154. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 880 (1997). 
 155. Id. at 882 (arguing that while a user and a reseller could contract for a 
warranty, so could a manufacturer and an initial user regarding damage to 
other property, but “[n]o court has thought that the mere possibility of such a 
contract term precluded tort recovery for damage to an Initial User’s other 
property”). 
 156. Id. at 877. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 877–78 (holding that the product was the ship created by the 
defendant manufacturer, and the added equipment was other property). The 
difficult question facing the Court was whether the initial user-added equip-
ment should be treated as part of the “product itself” or as “other property.” Id. 
For example, the initial user of the ship could not have sued the manufacturer 
of the defective hydraulic system under a theory that its malfunctioning 
harmed “other property” added by the ship’s final manufacturer. Id. at 883; see 
also Casa Clara Condo. Ass’n v. Charley Toppino & Sons Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244 
(Fla. 1993) (holding that a house is a single finished product, and purchasers 
cannot recover in tort even though defective concrete ruined the value of the 
house, because the entire house is treated as a single defective product, and is 
thus covered by the economic loss rule). Thus, as the court elaborated in Casa 
Clara, “[t]he concrete [component part] became an integral part of the finished 
product and, thus, did not injure ‘other’ property.” 620 So. 2d at 1247. Instead, 
courts deem the finished product (the ship) to be a single item that harmed 
itself, even if only one of its component parts fail, and thus best left to warran-
ty law. Saratoga Fishing, 520 U.S. at 883 (discussing how lower courts have 
held, following East River Steamship, that “it is not a component part [the hy-
draulic system], but the vessel—as placed in the stream of commerce by the 
manufacturer and its distributors—that is the ‘product’ that itself caused the 
harm”). 
 159. Saratoga Fishing, 520 U.S. at 882–83. 
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ill-suited to protect against a malfunctioning product that 
causes physical damage to user-added items: 
Initial users, when they buy, typically depend upon, and likely seek 
warranties that depend upon, a manufacturer’s primary business 
skill, namely, the assembly of workable product components into a 
marketable whole. Moreover, manufacturers and component suppliers 
can allocate through contract potential liability for a manufactured 
product that does not work . . . . There is no reason to think that ini-
tial users systematically control the manufactured product’s quality 
or . . . systematically allocate responsibility for user-added equip-
ment . . . in similar ways.160 
Moreover, having decided in favor of recovery for damage 
to the user-added equipment, the Court downplayed the poten-
tial for unlimited liability, relying on the fact that “a host of 
other tort principles,” such as “foreseeability, proximate cause, 
and the ‘economic loss’ doctrine” would continue to impose re-
strictions.161  
2. Deference to UCC 
A second way of understanding the concern about contract 
losing itself in tort prioritizes private ordering, namely defer-
ence to contract, specifically to the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) in the realm of products liability. It is the law of sales, 
and not the law of torts, which protects the buyer’s interest in 
the benefit of his bargain. Parties are free to determine by con-
tract the quality of goods which the seller is bound to deliver or 
remedies available to the buyer in the event goods do not 
measure up to agreed-upon quality. If the loss is purely eco-
nomic, the UCC gives the purchaser ample recourse under the 
particular provisions and requirements of the Code. On this 
view, strict products liability developed in large part to fill the 
gaps in the law of sales with respect to consumer purchasers. 
Limiting the application of strict products liability to consum-
ers’ actions involving physical injury allows the UCC to satisfy 
 
 160. Id. at 883–84 (citation omitted); see also id. at 882 (“The East River 
[Steamship] answer to this question—because the parties can contract for ap-
propriate sharing of the risks of harm—is not as satisfactory in the context of 
resale after an initial use. That is because . . . the Subsequent User does not 
contract directly with the manufacturer (or distributor). . . . [I]n the absence of 
a showing that it is ordinary business practice for user/resellers to offer a war-
ranty comparable to those typically provided by sellers of new products, the 
argument for extending East River [Steamship], replacing tort law with con-
tract law, is correspondingly weak.”). 
 161. Id. at 884. 
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the needs of the commercial sector and still protect the legiti-
mate expectations of consumers. 
The UCC was drafted with the intangible economic inter-
ests of those who purchase products in mind. Under the UCC, 
the buyer may recover from the seller for “injury to person or 
property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty”;162 
other consequential loss is recoverable only if the seller had 
reason to anticipate its occurrence.163 “Thus, while harm to per-
son and property is measured in traditional tort terms, the 
Code treats recovery for economic loss as an action in con-
tract.”164 Moreover, as explained by a Georgia court, “[a] manu-
facturer’s duty to sell goods meeting consumer expectations is 
governed by the requirements of warranty law . . . as set out in 
the Uniform Commercial Code.”165 The court stated further that 
“if strict liability in tort were considered to apply to the loss of 
bargains by disgruntled consumers, the subtle and technical 
provisions of warranty law established . . . through its enact-
ment of the UCC would be useless.”166 Courts have therefore 
expressed twin desires to defer to the legislature (which adopt-
ed the UCC) and to protect the space for contracting and allo-
cating risk carved out by warranty law. 
Indeed, this reasoning is at the heart of Seely.167 At the out-
set, the court stressed that the “legislative scheme of recovery” 
had not been superseded by tort, and that “[t]he law of sales 
has been carefully articulated to govern the economic relations 
between suppliers and consumers of goods.”168 Thus, the court 
concluded that strict liability did not develop to replace the 
UCC.169  
 
 162. UCC § 2-715(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014). 
 163. Id. § 2-715(2)(a). 
 164. Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. 
L. REV. 917, 948 (1966). 
 165. Chrysler Corp. v. Taylor, 234 S.E.2d 123, 125 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977). 
 166. Id.; see also Note, supra note 164, at 958 (“The establishment of manu-
facturer’s liability to subpurchasers for economic loss would effectively nullify 
several provisions of the [UCC] intended to permit contracting parties to con-
trol their economic relations through the bargaining process.”). 
 167. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965). 
 168. Id. at 149. Seely cites Prosser, Assault, supra note 10, at 1130, 1133, 
in support of the argument that various legislative rules concerning warran-
ties, notice, and contracting work well in a commercial setting. Seely, 403 P.2d 
at 150. 
 169. See Seely, 403 P.2d at 149 (holding that strict liability in tort evolved 
to deal with physical injuries, “not to undermine the warranty provisions of 
the sales act or of the Uniform Commercial Code”). But this point—that the 
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Subsequent courts placed even greater reliance on fidelity 
to the UCC and legislative intent. The Alaska Supreme Court 
held that “adoption of the doctrine of strict liability for econom-
ic loss would be contrary to the legislature’s intent.”170 The 
court reasoned that “[u]nder the [UCC] the manufacturer is 
given the right to avail himself of certain affirmative defenses 
which can minimize his liability for a purely economic loss.”171 
Disclaimers of liability and the entitlement to notice of the 
claimed breach are rights of the manufacturer that would be 
circumvented in a manner “not envisioned by our legislature 
when it enacted the UCC . . . . Further, manufacturers could no 
longer look to the [UCC] provisions to provide a predictable def-
inition of potential liability for direct economic loss.”172  
Ultimately, this rationale proved so strong that even the 
New Jersey Supreme Court, which led the charge to expand 
strict liability to economic losses in Santor, retreated from its 
position. First, in 1985, in Spring Motors Distributors v. Ford 
Motor Co., the court narrowed the scope of Santor by refusing 
to apply its holding to a dispute between two commercial par-
ties, recognizing that the rationale of achieving “justice” for the 
consumer did not apply where the parties had more equitable 
bargaining power.173 The court reasoned that “economic expec-
 
UCC was meant to preclude tort liability for benefit of the bargain—has been 
contested. See Comment, Manufacturers’ Liability to Remote Purchasers for 
“Economic Loss” Damages—Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539, 545 
(1966) (“The comment to the privity section of the [UCC] states that the sec-
tion is ‘not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether 
the seller’s warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons 
in the distributive chain.’” (citing UCC § 2-318 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2014))).  
 170. Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 286 (Alaska 1976); 
see also id. at 285–86 (“[R]ecognition of a doctrine of strict liability in tort for 
economic loss would seriously jeopardize the continued viability of these 
[UCC] rights. The economically injured consumer would have a theory of re-
dress not envisioned by our legislature when it enacted the UCC, since this 
strict liability remedy would be completely unrestrained by disclaimer, liabil-
ity limitation and notice provisions.”). 
 171. Id. at 285. 
 172. Id. at 285–86; see also Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 324 
N.E.2d 583, 588 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974) (“[T]he doctrine of implied warranty in 
tort must be limited in its applicability. Otherwise, unlimited application of 
the doctrine would emasculate the [UCC] provisions dealing with products lia-
bility.”). 
 173. Spring Motors Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 670–71 (N.J. 
1985); see also id. at 670 (“In the present case, which involves an action be-
tween commercial parties, we need not reconsider the Santor rule that an ul-
timate consumer may recover in strict liability for direct economic loss.”). 
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tations that are protected by the UCC are not entitled to sup-
plemental protection by negligence principles.”174 And then, in 
1997, in Alloway v. General Marine Industries, it officially ab-
rogated Santor.175 The court emphasized that Santor had been 
decided “[o]ver thirty years ago, before the UCC took effect.”176 
The court retreated from Santor, holding that where “the harm 
suffered is to the product itself, unaccompanied by personal in-
jury or property damage, we conclude[] that principles of con-
tract, rather than of tort law, [are] better suited to resolve the 
purchaser’s claim” when determining the appropriate statute of 
limitations.177 “By providing for express and implied warran-
ties, the UCC amply protects all buyers—commercial purchas-
ers and consumers alike—from economic loss arising out of the 
purchase of a defective product.”178 
  CONCLUSION: SHOULD THE CITADEL BE PRESERVED?   
 Prosser’s discussion of the products liability tort law in 
1966 in The Fall of the Citadel reveals just how much it was in 
a state of flux concerning purely economic losses. Various doc-
trines competed against each other and the future was unclear. 
One could imagine a future where a disappointed user could 
not generally recover pure economic losses, but a user who suf-
fered lost profits because of a product defect could.179 Or per-
haps a user could recover economic losses, including the loss of 
value of the product, if it destroyed itself.180 Or if the defect was 
one which posed an unreasonable threat to bodily harm.181 Or 
in all cases.182 Instead, the defenders of privity consolidated 
their forces around Seely and launched a furious counter-attack 
under the banner of the economic loss rule.183  
 
 174. Id. at 673. 
 175. Alloway v. Gen. Marine Indus., 695 A.2d 264 (N.J. 1997). 
 176. Id. at 269. 
 177. Id. at 270. 
 178. Id. at 275. 
 179. E.g., Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633 (Wash. 1913) (applying an 
exception to privity of contract to allow suit for recovery for business and repu-
tational financial losses). 
 180. The position taken in Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 153 N.Y.S. 131 
(App. Div. 1915). 
 181. A position that crystalized in Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Cat-
erpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 182. The position taken in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 
305 (N.J. 1965). 
 183. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965). 
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In The Fall of the Citadel, Prosser deserves credit for not-
ing the emergence of two camps on strict liability recovery for 
“loss of bargain” damages, but his embrace of the no-recovery 
position is tentative, restricted to a narrow category of damag-
es, and not backed by much (if any) theoretical justification.184  
Subsequently developed rationales based upon acoustic 
separation of contract and tort, so as to prevent contract law 
from drowning “in a sea of tort,”185 are likewise missing under-
lying theoretical justification. Vincent Johnson has posited: 
If there is a convincing rationale for the economic loss rule, it is that 
the rule performs a critical boundary-line function, separating the law 
of torts from the law of contracts. More specifically, “the underlying 
purpose of the economic loss rule is to preserve the distinction be-
tween contract and tort theories in circumstances where both theories 
could apply.”186 
This boundary line function is a truism (and an insightful 
one). But it is also question begging, a truism in search of a 
sound theoretical justification. Commentators and courts have 
recognized that “[b]roadly speaking, the economic loss rule is 
intended to maintain the boundary between contract law and 
tort law.”187 But debates about the economic loss rule have ob-
scured the fundamental issue: the justification for recognizing 
public policy imposed duties in tort, especially in the sphere of 
commercial or financial losses. Only once this is decided—
namely the appropriate domain for tort law—can the economic 
loss rule police the borders. 
Many courts and scholars have recognized grey areas 
where tort and contract overlap. Prosser famously described 
 
 184. Prosser likewise did not anticipate that the damage a defective chattel 
causes to itself and consequential losses flowing from a defective product 
would be swept into the economic loss rule.  
 185. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 
(1986). 
 186. Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic 
Loss Rule, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523, 546 (2009). Johnson does not—in my 
view—provide a satisfactory answer to the question of what belongs in the 
domain of tort. He relies instead on an argument that tort claims supported by 
“fundamental tort policies” should not be preempted by contract claims. See id. 
at 559 (“Contractual performance always takes place within a matrix of other 
legal obligations, including those imposed by the law of torts.”); id. at 563 
(“Tort liability should be imposed to encourage safe practices, not to ensure 
that careless conduct goes unremedied. . . . [There are] important public poli-
cies relating to fault, deterrence, and compensation that are the basis of Amer-
ican tort law.”); id. at 571 (“[J]udicial determination that considerations relat-
ing to fault, deterrence, personal responsibility, and compensation warrant the 
imposition of liability.”). 
 187. Town of Alma v. AZCO Const., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1259 (Colo. 2000).  
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“[t]he borderland of tort and contract, and the nature and limi-
tations of the tort action arising out of a breach of contract, [as] 
poorly defined.”188 And Prosser memorably characterized war-
ranty law as “a freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of 
tort and contract.”189 Looking to the “essence” of tort and con-
tract is not likely to be fully satisfactory, especially as catego-
ries of claims—product defect serving as a prime example—
have migrated across the divide. Nor does the conventional def-
erence to contract rationale, which posits that the voluntary al-
location of economic risks between contracting parties (or, more 
broadly, parties that could have contracted) produces better so-
cial outcomes than forcing the seller or manufacturer to bear 
them fully, satisfactorily answer the questions when and why 
one should privilege such private ordering.  
A sounder theoretical grounding is provided by a “cheapest 
cost avoider” rationale—one of the animating justifications for 
strict products liability for product manufacturers, but which 
plays out differently with respect to consideration of economic 
risks.190 Whereas manufacturers are almost always in a better 
position to control and insure risks in the manufacturing pro-
duction process, and perhaps as a general matter (apart from 
the situations where products are not used as intended or are 
modified by the end user) with respect to risks of physical harm 
and damage to property, the conclusion flips with respect to 
considerations of economic risks for which the end user often 
possesses an informational advantage over the seller about po-
tential uses and the consequential risk flowing from those us-
es.191  
 
 188. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 452. According to Prosser, the uncertainty 
“permitted a degree of flexibility” that freed courts “to look to the purpose of 
the rule of law in question.” Id. 
 189. Prosser, Fall, supra note 11, at 800. 
 190. See generally GEISTFELD, supra note 2, at 258 (“In evaluating the re-
spective roles of [tort and contract law], . . . the appropriate rule depends on 
whether consumers can adequately protect themselves with contracting. . . . 
As applied to the issue of pure economic loss, this principle means that the tort 
duty should not encompass the risk of pure economic loss if the ordinary con-
sumer has good information about the risk and can adequately protect her in-
terests by contracting with product sellers.”). 
 191. See Richard E. Speidel, Products Liability, Economic Loss and the 
UCC, 40 TENN. L. REV. 309, 317–18 (1973) (“While the social needs associated 
with product safety justify strict liability where the product is so dangerous 
that damage to person or property can occur, the case is not so compelling 
where other commercial losses are involved.”). 
  
1882 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:1845 
 
Purchasers of products typically plan to use the product in 
a certain way or desire a product of a certain quality. In Seely, 
for example, the court remarked how, given the different ways 
in which truckers could use particular trucks in their respec-
tive businesses, such information is more readily knowable to 
purchasers, as opposed to the seller.192 The user has infor-
mation about how they want to use a truck that the manufac-
turer does not have. This informational advantage means the 
end user is in the best position to assign usage risks, to know 
which risks are worth assuming and which are not.193 The end 
user, moreover, may also be in a better position than the seller 
to mitigate and insure against certain risks, at least when it 
involves potentially disappointed economic expectations.194 Al-
lowing parties to allocate risk enables the party best able to 
bear that risk to assume that risk—maximizing efficiency from 
a deal.195  
The U.S. Supreme Court likewise implicitly embraced such 
a cheapest cost avoider rationale in Saratoga Fishing, allowing 
the subsequent purchaser to sue in tort, notwithstanding the 
fact that it was theoretically possible for him to have protected 
 
 192. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 150–51 (Cal. 1965); see also 
GEISTFELD, supra note 2, at 259 (“The consumer knows how the product will 
be used and has better information about the financial harms, like lost profits, 
that could be caused by a defect.”). 
 193. See Trans World Airlines Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 148 N.Y.S.2d 
284, 290 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (“Damages for inferior quality, per se, should better 
be left to suits [with privity] since they depend on the terms of the bargain  
. . . .”). 
 194. See Pa. Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 
1169 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[C]ontract law . . . provides the appropriate set of rules 
when an individual wishes a product to perform a certain task in a certain 
way, or expects or desires a product of a particular quality so that it is fit for 
ordinary use.”); see also GEISTFELD, supra note 2, at 259 (“This information 
enables the ordinary consumer to protect her interests by either contracting 
with the seller for warranty coverage, purchasing other types of insurance, or 
obtaining a supply of spare parts.”); William K. Jones, Product Defects Caus-
ing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of Contract over Tort, 44 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 731, 765–66 (1990) (“[T]he buyer is clearly in the best position to insure 
against the [economic] loss [to the buyer’s business]” given the availability of 
business interruption insurance as well as buyer’s ability to “maintain[] spare 
parts, excess capacity, alternative operating modes, and the like.”). 
 195. See Purvis v. Consol. Energy Prods. Co., 674 F.2d 217, 222 (4th Cir. 
1982) (“The right to disclaim warranties and limit remedies enables commer-
cial parties to allocate risks between the buyer and the seller in the most effi-
cient manner and thereby to maximize their respective gains from a transac-
tion.”); see also Jones, supra note 194, at 797 (“When contract is available as 
an alternative, it is possible for parties to reach efficient solutions appropriate 
to their particular circumstances.”). 
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himself via contract.196 The Court reasoned that, while initial 
users of products seek warranties depending upon a manufac-
turer’s ability to create finished products, and while manufac-
turers and component suppliers can allocate risk through con-
tract, initial users are poorly positioned to do so when they sell 
to subsequent purchasers.197 
Prosser offered just the slightest hint of such a “cheapest 
cost avoider” rationale for the economic loss rule in products, 
namely, that “commercial buyers are usually quite able to pro-
tect themselves.”198 With this seed, a further field of exploration 
is opened up. Seen in this light, the citadel’s last bastion—the 
economic loss rule in products cases—is justified as a means to 
induce the putative victims, here, the parties with superior in-
formation regarding risk of financial loss, to protect them-
selves. 
 
 
 196. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 882 (1997). 
 197. Id. at 882–84.  
 198. Prosser, Assault, supra note 10, at 1133. Prosser’s formulation, em-
phasizing “commercial” buyers raises a further question: What about unequal 
bargaining power, as might be likely with respect to noncommercial buyers? 
Justice Traynor remarked in Seely: “The law of warranty is not limited to par-
ties in a somewhat equal bargaining position.” Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 
P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965). Justice Peters, however, suggested the need to dis-
tinguish “commercial transactions” involving more sophisticated parties and 
sales to “ordinary consumer[s].” Id. at 156 (Peters, J., concurring and dissent-
ing); see also Jones, supra note 194, at 796–97 (defending the economic loss 
rule for “commercial transactions” as distinct from “general run of manufac-
turer-consumer transactions,” given “limitations on consumer knowledge” and 
“disparities in consumer wealth” that apply to the latter category). 
